PRESS RELEASE

Alex Kamwi Law Agents Practitioners CC

Members of the public are warned to be on their guard of persons who hold themselves out to be legal practitioners or who provide reserved legal services, while in fact not qualified under the Legal Practitioners Act to practice law.  “Clients” of such agents of a close corporation enjoy very little protection as these close corporations and their agents are not admitted professionals who must practice in terms of a statute.  They are accordingly not covered by professional indemnity insurance, do not hold trust accounts, are not supported by the Law Society and do not have back-up from the Fidelity Fund.  Due to a lack of the mentioned insurance and support, the risks to clients are substantial as they may suffer severe prejudice, financial loss and irreparable harm.

In this regard various criminal complaints are pending for further investigation and/or prosecution.

The Law Society of Namibia, being the governing and regulating body of admitted legal practitioners in Namibia, would like to draw the public’s attention to an advertisement placed by Mr Alex Kamwi pertaining to the services which his newly registered close corporation will be rendering based on an incorrect citation of a part of the judgment given in the Supreme Court in the matter Ex Parte In Re: Kamwi v Law Society of Namibia 2009 (2) NR569 (SC) – Case SA21/2008.

Mr Kamwi inter alia contends that the Close Corporation Act, Act 26 of 1988, entitles him to act as agent of Alex Kamwi Law Agents Practitioners CC on behalf of the close corporation’s clients and to therefore be able to appear in any court in Namibia.  This “argument” had already been made in the Supreme Court matter and Mtambanengwe AJA concluded as follows in this regard:
 

“[16] … While Mr Kamwi vigorously denies that he applied to be admitted as a legal practitioner, in essence he contradicts this denial in many ways. For example, during his submissions in this court he was pertinently asked to specify the things he was seeking to be authorised to do. In substance he listed all the things which a person who is not admitted as a legal practitioner is forbidden to do by s 21 of the Legal Practitioners Act. Mr Kamwi identifies himself as one with second and third respondents. In para 6.1.7 of his heads of argument in this appeal he baldly states:

'If a paralegal firm's memorandum of Association/founding statement is incorporated in terms of s 4 of Act 61 of 1973/s 13(1) and 14(2) of Act  26 of 1988 as amended and he or she is issued with a certificate to commence his or her business by that law he or she may prepare summons or process or commence, carry on or defend any action, suit or other proceedings in any court of law in the name of or on behalf of any other person. See art 98(2) of our Constitution.' [My emphasis.]

[17] …
[18] Except for a few quibbles (eg about who issues a summons, the registrar/clerk of court or the legal representative of a party) Mr Kamwi does not deny doing what the Law Society complains he and the other entities he represents do. He claims he does all that on the authority of  art 21(1)(j). He submits in para 4.7 of his heads of argument (in respect of his ex parte application):

'I submit that the Court erred in law for finding that there is no basis in Law on which to grant me the relief sought, I say so because in terms of art 1(6) of our constitution, the Namibian Constitution which provides in art 21(1)(j) that all persons shall have the right to practice (as is) their profession or carry out any occupation, trade or business, is the Supreme Law of Namibia. It is the most authoritative and thus binding source of law. Therefore, to say that there is no basis in law is a fantasy because no law in Namibia or elsewhere is above our Constitution.'

One only needs to imagine Mr Kamwi advising a lay client along such lines to see the real danger to the public posed by an unadmitted person purporting to act as a legal practitioner. It is from such dangers that the Law Society is duty bound to protect the public.”

Should you have any doubt as to whether a person is in fact a legal practitioner, you are welcome to contact the Law Society of Namibia.  The telephone numbers are Windhoek 230363 or 230088.

SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF NAMIBIA, ADV D.F. SMALL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE HIGH COURT LEGAL YEAR – 16 JANUARY 2012

YOUR LORDSHIP MR. JUSTICE DAMASEB, JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA, MY LORDS AND LADIES
THE HONOURABLE OMBUDSMAN
THE HONOURABLE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIETY OF ADVOCATES
THE PRESIDENT OF THE NAMIBIA LAW ASSOCIATION
MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSION
CANDIDATE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS
THE REGISTRAR AND STAFF OF THE HIGH COURT
THE MEDIA
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN  

As had been said last year during this occasion, the High Court Legal Year Opening has become a highlight on our professional calendars, and created platform those involved to voice their concerns, challenges and achievements. And as was also said by my predecessor, it has the added bonus to greet you all after a well deserved rest period and to wish everybody a year full of success, joy and prosperity.

I have decided to address one issue at this occasion. It is nothing new, and has also been raised two years ago by a previous president of the Law Society of Namibia.
The issue I want to raise is the one of OUTSTANDING JUDGEMENTS.

I can do no better than quoting what Advocate Geier stated on that occasion: “The issue of outstanding judgments has featured as an important Rule of Law topic in the last couple of years at this occasion and as this issue has not yet been entirely resolved I am duty-bound, as my predecessors were, to address this issue also on this occasion.”

Unfortunately, when one addresses an issue like this one, I’m reminded of the saying that states: “Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan.”

We all know that the independence of the judiciary is recognised in all democracies as a sine qua non for the promotion of a culture of democracy and human rights. Consequently, the Namibian Constitution in Articles 78(2) and (3), the guarantees that the courts –… shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law[,] and further that – [n]o member of the Cabinet or the Legislature or any other person shall interfere with Judges or judicial officers in the exercise of their judicial functions, and all organs of the State shall accord such assistance as the Courts may require to protect their independence, dignity, and effectiveness, subject to the terms of this Constitution or any other law.

I believe that when one considers just how far the independence of the courts go, it is appropriate to consider the well know principle that us lawyers know as Quis costodiet ipsos custodes-who watches the watchmen-who will protect us from our protectors?

The doctrine of the separation of powers recognises the existence of three organs of state: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The doctrine however  also recognises the fact that, in order to guarantee and protect the liberties of the individuals and to prevent dictatorship and absolutism, mechanisms need to be established that are capable of putting constitutional and legal restraints on, not only the powers of government, but also on other organs of state.

I believe it is important to realize that judicial independence is by no means unfettered: it is fettered by the Constitution and the law. Judges are accountable to the Judicial Service Commission in the performance of their judicial functions, and are further subject to the rules relating to professional ethics, discipline and dismissal as stipulated in the Constitution and other law.

ANIL RAI V. STATE OF BIHAR [2001] RD-SC 367 (6 August 2001) ...

Thomas J

The Apex Court made an exhortation in 1976 through a judgment which is reported as RC Sharma vs. UOI [1976(3) SCC 574] for expediting delivery of judgments. I too wish to repeat those words as follows:
"Nevertheless an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments." Quarter of a century has elapsed thereafter but the situation, instead of improving has only worsened. We understand that many cases remain in area of "judgment reserved" for long periods. It is heartening that most of the judges of the High Courts are discharging their duties by expeditiously pronouncing judgments. But it is disheartening that a handful of few are unmindful of their obligation and the oath of office they have solemnly taken as they cause such inordinate delay in pronouncing judgments.

“In a country like ours where people consider the judges only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eyebrows, some-times genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the rule of law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be made to come up to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice."

I conclude with a final quote from the same case: "Justice should not only be done, but should also appear to have been done. Similarly, whereas justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is even worse than that.”

I thank you